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Abstract
In this paper, we present the middleware architecture of MAFTIA, an
ESPRIT project aiming at developing an open architecture for transac-
tional operations on the Internet. The former is a modular and scalable
cryptographic group-oriented middleware suite, suitable for supporting
reliable multi-party interactions under partial synchrony models, and sub-
ject to malicious as well as accidental faults.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present the middleware architecture of MAFTIA, a project
aiming at developing an open architecture for transactional operations on the
Internet. MAFTIA exploits common approaches to fault tolerance, of both acci-
dental and malicious faults. The middleware platform is a distributed, modular
and scalable cryptographic group-oriented suite, suitable for supporting reliable
multi-party interactions under partial synchrony models, subject to malicious as
well as accidental faults. A combination of intrusion prevention and tolerance
measures is sought, under a hybrid failure model that identies at least three
classes of relevant faults: vulnerabilities, attacks, and intrusions.
2 Failure Model
A crucial aspect of any architecture is the failure model upon which the system
architecture is conceived and component interactions are dened. The failure
model conditions the correctness analysis, both in the value and time domains,
and dictates crucial aspects of system conguration, such as the placement and
choice of components, level of redundancy, types of algorithms, and so forth.
There are essentially two dierent kinds of failure model: controlled failure
assumptions and arbitrary failure assumptions.
Failure Assumptions
Controlled failure assumptions specify qualitative and quantitative bounds on
component failures. For example, the failure assumptions may specify that
components only have timing failures, and that no more than f components
fail during an interval of reference. Alternatively, they can admit value failures,
but not allow components to spontaneously generate or forge messages, nor
impersonate, collude with, or send conflicting information to other components.
This approach is extremely realistic, since it represents very well how common
systems work under the presence of accidental faults, failing in a benign manner
most of the time. It can be extrapolated to malicious faults, by assuming that
they are qualitatively and quantitatively limited. However, it is traditionally
dicult to model the behaviour of a hacker, so we have a problem of coverage
that does not recommend this approach unless a solution can be found.
Arbitrary failure assumptions specify no qualitative or quantitative bounds
on component failures. Obviously, this should be understood in the context of
a universe of "possible" failures of the concerned operation mode of the com-
ponent. For example, the possible failure modes of interaction, between com-
ponents of a distributed system are limited to combinations of timeliness, form,
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meaning, and target of those interactions (let us call them messages). In this
context, an arbitrary failure means the capability of generating a message at any
time, with whatever syntax and semantics (form and meaning), and sending it
to anywhere in the system.
Hybrid assumptions combining both kinds of failure assumptions would be
desirable. They are a known framework in dependable system design vis-a-vis
accidental failures[6, 8, 13]. Generally, they consist of allocating dierent as-
sumptions to dierent subsets or components of the system, and have been used
in a number of systems and protocols. Hybrid models allow stronger assump-
tions to be made about parts of the system that can justiably be assumed to
exhibit fail-controlled behaviour, whilst other parts of the system are still al-
lowed an arbitrary behaviour. This is advantageous in modular and distributed
system architectures such as MAFTIA. However, this is only feasible when the
model is well-founded, that is, the behaviour of every single subset of the system
can be modelled and/or enforced with high coverage, and this brings us back,
at least for parts of the system, to the problem identied for controlled failure
assumptions.
Composite Failure Model
The problems identied in our discussion of failure assumptions point to the need
for the MAFTIA failure model to have characteristics enabling the denition
of intermediate, hybrid assumptions, with adequate coverage. A rst step in
this direction is the denition of a composite failure model specically aimed at
representing the failures that may result from several classes of malicious faults.
A second step is the denition of a set of techniques that act at dierent points
within this composite failure model and which, combined in several ways, yield
dependability vis-a-vis particular classes of faults. We are going to base our
reasoning on two guiding principles:
 the sequence: attack + vulnerability ! intrusion ! failure
 the recursive use of fault tolerance and fault prevention
Concerning the mechanisms of failure, Figure 1 represents the fundamental
sequence: attack + vulnerability ! intrusion! failure. It distinguishes between
several kinds of faults capable of contributing to a security failure. Vulnerabili-
ties are the primordial faults existing inside the components, essentially design
or conguration faults (e.g., coding faults allowing program stack overflow, les
with root setuid in UNIX, na¨ve passwords, unprotected TCP/IP ports). At-
tacks are malicious interaction faults that attempt to activate one or more of
those vulnerabilities (e.g., port scans, email viruses, malicious Java applets or
ActiveX controls). An attack that successfully activates a vulnerability causes
an intrusion. This further step towards failure is normally characterized by an
erroneous state in the system that may take several forms (e.g., an unauthorized
privileged account with telnet access, a system le with undue access permissions
to the hacker). Such erroneous states can be unveiled by intrusion detection, as
we will see ahead, but if nothing is done to process the errors resulting from the
intrusion, failure of one or more security properties will occur.
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Figure 1: The Composite Failure Model of MAFTIA
The composite model embraced in MAFTIA allows the combined introduc-
tion of several techniques. Note that two causes concur to create an intrusion,
as shown in Figure 1: vulnerabilities and attacks.
To begin with, we can prevent some attacks from occurring, thereby reducing
the level of threat imposed on the system. Attack prevention can be performed,
for example, by selectively ltering access to parts of the system (e.g., if a
component is behind a rewall and cannot be accessed from the Internet, it
cannot be attacked from there). However, it is impossible to prevent all attacks
(e.g., some components have to be placed outside the rewall in a Demilitarised
Zone), and in consequence, other measures must be taken.
On the vulnerability side, vulnerability prevention helps to reduce the de-
gree of vulnerability by construction. However, many systems are assembled
from COTS components that contain known vulnerabilities. When it is not
possible to prevent the attack(s) that would activate these vulnerabilities, a
rst step would be to attempt vulnerability removal. Sometimes this is done
at the cost of eliminating the system functions that contain the vulnerabilities.
The above-mentioned approaches can be complemented, still at the attack level,
with tolerance measures achieved by combinations of the classic techniques: de-
tection, recovery, and masking. The detection of port scans or other anomalous
activity at the external border of the system forms part of the functionality
of some systems generically known as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Al-
though an intrusion has not yet occurred, there is an erroneous symptom that
can be addressed by several attack countermeasures. For example, honey-pots
and other evasive measures at the periphery of the system can be used to mask
the eects of the attack.
The various combinations of techniques discussed above provide a range of
alternatives for achieving intrusion prevention (see Figure 1), i.e. attempting
to avoid the occurrence of intrusions. Whilst this is a valid and widely used
approach, its absolute success cannot be guaranteed in all situations, and for
all systems. The reason is obvious: it may not be possible to handle all attacks,
either because not all attacks are known or new ones may appear, or because
not all attacks can be guaranteed to be detected or masked. Similar reasoning
applies to vulnerabilities. In consequence, some attacks will succeed in produc-
ing intrusions, requiring forms of intrusion tolerance, as shown in the right part
of Figure 1, in order to prevent system failure. Again, these can assume several
forms: detection (e.g., of intruded account activity, of Trojan horse activity);
recovery (e.g., interception and neutralization of intruder activity); or mask-
ing (e.g., voting between several components, including a minority of intruded
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ones).
The above discussion has laid the foundations for achieving our objective: a
well-founded hybrid failure model, that is, one where dierent components have
dierent faulty behaviours. Consider a component for which a given controlled
failure assumption was made. How can we achieve coverage of such an assump-
tion, given the unpredictability of attacks and the elusiveness of vulnerabilities?
The key is in a recursive use of fault tolerance and fault prevention. Think of
the component as a system: it can be constructed through the combined use of
removal of internal vulnerabilities, prevention of some attacks, and implemen-
tation of intrusion tolerance mechanisms internal to the component, in order to
prevent the component from exhibiting failures.
Looked upon from the outside now, at the next higher level of abstraction,
the level of the outer system, the would-be component failures we prevented
restrict the system faults the component can produce. In fact we have performed
fault prevention, that is, we have a component with a controlled behaviour vis-
a-vis malicious faults. This principle:
 establishes a divide-and-conquer strategy for building modular fault-tolerant
systems;
 can be applied in dierent ways to any component;
 can be applied recursively at as many levels of abstraction as are found to
be useful.
Components exhibit a coverage that is justiably given by the techniques
used in their implementation, and can subsequently be used in the construction
of fault-tolerant protocols under the hybrid failure model.
3 Synchrony Model
Research in distributed systems algorithms has traditionally been based on one
of two canonical models: fully asynchronous and fully synchronous models[15].
Asynchronous models do not allow timeliness specications. They are time-
free, that is, they are characterized by an absolute independence of time, and
distributed systems based on such models typically have the following charac-
teristics:
Pa 1 Unbounded or unknown processing delays
Pa 2 Unbounded or unknown message delivery delays
Pa 3 Unbounded or unknown rate of drift of local clocks
Pa 4 Unbounded or unknown dierence of local clocks
Asynchronous models obviously resist timing attacks, i.e. attacks on the
timing assumptions of the model, which are non-existent in this case. However,
because of their time-free nature, asynchronous models cannot solve timed prob-
lems. For example, they cannot address Quality of Service (QoS) specications,
which are of increasing importance in the measure of the quality of transac-
tional systems in open networks such as the Internet (e.g., stock exchange,
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e-commerce). They cannot reason in terms of time, either relative or abso-
lute, which dictates a lot of the functionality of interactive applications, such as
on-line operations on the stock market. "False" asynchronous algorithms have
been deployed over the years, exhibiting subtle but real failures, thanks to the
inappropriate use of timeouts in a supposedly time-free model.
In practice, many of the emerging applications we see today, particularly on
the Internet, have interactivity or mission-criticality requirements. That is, ser-
vice must be provided on time, either because of user-dictated quality-of-service
requirements (e.g., network transaction servers, multimedia rendering, synchro-
nized groupware), or because of dependability constraints (e.g., air trac con-
trol). Synchronous models allow timeliness specications. In this type of model,
it is possible to solve all hard problems (e.g., consensus, atomic broadcast, clock
synchronization)[3]. In consequence, such models solve timed problem spec-
ications, one precondition for at least a subset of the applications targeted
in MAFTIA, for the reasons explained above. Synchronous models have the
following characteristics:
Ps 1 There exists a known bound for processing delays
Ps 2 There exists a known bound for message delivery delays
Ps 3 There exists a known bound for the rate of drift of local clocks
Ps 4 There exists a known bound for the dierence among local clocks
However, synchronous models are fragile in terms of the coverage of timeli-
ness assumptions such as: positioning of events in the timeline and determining
execution durations. Indeed, to achieve these characteristics, some additional
timing assumptions must be made concerning the behaviour of the system with
regard to component failures. These timing bounds are assumed to be valid for
correct processes, and conversely their achievement must not be disturbed by
incorrect processes. It is easy to see that synchronous models are susceptible to
timing attacks, since they make strong assumptions about things happening on
time.
Partial Synchrony
The introductory words above explain why synchronism is more than a mere
circumstantial attribute in distributed systems subjected to malicious faults:
absence of time is detrimental to quality of service; presence of time increases
vulnerability. Intermediate timed partially synchronous models have deservedly
received great attention recently. They provide better results, essentially for
three reasons: (i) they allow timeliness specications; (ii) they admit failure of
those specications; (iii) they provide timing failure detection.
We are particularly interested in a model based on the existence of a timely
computing base, which is both a timely execution assistant and a timing fail-
ure detection oracle that ensures time-domain correctness of applications in
environments of uncertain synchronism[14]. The timely computing base model
addresses a broader spectrum of problems than those solved by previous timed
partially synchronous models, such as the quasi-synchronous[12] and the timed-
asynchronous models[4]. All these works share the same observation: synchro-
nism or asynchronism are not homogeneous properties of systems. That is, they
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vary with time, and they vary with the part of the system being considered. In
the timely computing base model, it is assumed that systems have an architec-
ture such that applications, however asynchronous they may be and whatever
their scale, can rely on services provided by a special module which is timely
and reliable.
Research in this area has focused on benign (non-arbitrary, non-malicious)
failure models. However, the architectural characteristics of the timely comput-
ing base enable the model to be extended so as to be resilient to value- as well as
time-domain failures. This would contribute to supporting what we described
earlier as a hybrid failure model, encompassing malicious faults whilst guar-
anteeing system timeliness in a much more robust way than fully synchronous
models would.
We call such an extended model, whose development we will pursue in the
MAFTIA project, a Trusted Timely Computing Base, or TTCB. In one sense, a
TTCB has design principles similar to the very well known paradigm in security
of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB)[1]. However, the objectives are drastically
dierent. A TCB aims at fault prevention and ensures that the whole appli-
cation state and resources are tamper-proof. It is based on logical correctness
and makes no attempt to reason in terms of time. In contrast, a TTCB aims at
fault tolerance: application components can be tampered with, but the whole
application should not fail. In other words, a TTCB is an architectural artefact
supporting the construction and trusted execution of fault-tolerant protocols
and applications running under a partially synchronous model.
The architecture of a system with a TTCB is suggested by Figure 2. The
rst relevant aspect is that the heterogeneity of system properties is incorpo-
rated into the system architecture. There is a generic or payload system, over a
global network or payload channel. This pregures what is normally "the sys-
tem" in homogeneous architectures, that is, the place where the protocols and
applications run. The latter can have any degree of synchronism, and be sub-
jected to arbitrary attacks. Additionally, there is a control part, made of local
TTCB modules, interconnected by some form of medium, the control channel.
We will refer to this set up as the distributed TTCB, or simply TTCB when
there is no ambiguity. The second relevant aspect of the TTCB is that its well-
dened properties are preserved by construction, regardless of the properties of
applications running with its assistance: it is synchronous, and it is trusted to
execute as specied, being resilient to intrusions.
Unlike the classic TCB, the TTCB can be a fairly modest and simple compo-
nent of the system, used as an assistant for parts of the execution of the payload
protocols and applications. Moreover, depending on the type of application, it
is not necessary that all sites have a local TTCB. Consider the development of
a fault-tolerant TTP (Trusted Third Party) based on a group of replicas that
collectively ensure the correct behaviour of the TTP service vis-a-vis malicious
faults. One possibility is for the replica group activity to be based on algo-
rithms that support an arbitrary failure assumptions model (e.g., asynchronous
randomized Byzantine Agreement), with the corresponding penalty in perfor-
mance and lack of timeliness. Alternatively, the replica group management may
rely on simpler algorithms that are at least partially executed in a synchronous
subsystem with a benign (intrusion-free) failure model. Running these parts
of the algorithm on a distributed TTCB substantiates the coverage of these
assumptions.
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Figure 2: Trusted Timely Computing Base Model
A TTCB should be built in a way that secures both the synchronism prop-
erties mentioned earlier, and its correct behaviour vis-a-vis malicious faults. In
consequence, a local TTCB can be either a special hardware module, such as
a tamperproof device, an auxiliary rmware-based microcomputer board, or a
software-based real-time and security kernel running on a plain desktop ma-
chine such as a PC or workstation. Likewise, a distributed TTCB assumes the
existence of a timely inter-module communication channel. This channel can
assume several forms exhibiting dierent levels of timeliness and resilience. It
may or not be based on a physically dierent network from the one supporting
the payload channel. Virtual channels with predictable timing characteristics
coexisting with essentially asynchronous channels are feasible in some current
networks, even over the Internet[11]. Such virtual channels can be made secure
through virtual private network (VPN) techniques, which consist of building
secure cryptographic IP tunnels linking all TTCB modules together, and these
techniques are now supported by standards [5].
4 Topological Model
Previous work on large-scale open distributed systems has shown the value of
topology awareness in the construction of ecient protocols [10], from both
functionality and performance viewpoints. The principle is explained very sim-
ply: (i) the topology of the system is set up in ways that may enhance its
properties; (ii) protocols and mechanisms in general are designed in order to
recognize system topology and take advantage from it. This is achieved both
by creating adequate physical topologies (the part of the system under the con-
trol of the organization, e.g., the local networks) and by logically reorganizing
existing physical topologies (the part of the system outside the control of the
organization, e.g. the Internet).
We intend to extrapolate the virtues of topology awareness to security in the
MAFTIA architecture, through a few principles for introducing topological con-
structs that facilitate the combined implementation of malicious fault tolerance
and fault prevention. The rst principle is to use topology to facilitate sepa-
ration of concerns: the site-participant separation in the internal structure of
system hosts separates communication from processing; and the WAN-of-LANs
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duality at network level separates communication amongst local aggregates of
sites, which we call facilities, from long-haul communication amongst facilities.
The second principle is to use topology to construct clustering in a natural way.
Two points of clustering seem natural in the MAFTIA large-scale architecture:
sites and facilities. These principles are illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Two-tier WAN-of-LANs
Sites are hidden behind a single entry-point, a Facility Gateway, a logical
gateway that represents the local network members, for the global network.
From a security viewpoint, participant-site clustering allows investing in the
implementation of fault-tolerant and fault-preventive mechanisms at node level
to collectively serve the applications residing in the node. On the other hand,
the opportunities oered by site-facility clustering with regard to security are
manifold: rewalling at the Facility Gateway; establishing inter-facility secure
tunnels ending in the facility agents; inspecting incoming and outgoing trac
for attack and intrusion detection; ingress and egress trac ltering; internal
topology hiding through network address translation, etc.
System Components
The architecture of a MAFTIA node is represented in Figure 4, in which the
local topology and the dependence relations between modules are depicted by
the orientation of the ("depends-on") arrows. In Figure 4 the set of layers is
divided into site and participant parts. The site part has access to and de-
pends on a physical networking infrastructure, not represented for simplicity.
The participant part oers support to local participants engaging in distributed
computations. The lowest layer is the Multipoint Network module, MN, cre-
ated over the physical infrastructure. Its main properties are the provision of
multipoint addressing and a moderate best-eort error recovery ability, both
depending on topology and site liveness information. The MN layer hides the
particulars of the underlying network to which a given site is directly attached,
and is as thin as the intrinsic properties of the latter allow.
In the site part, the Site Failure Detector module, SF, is in charge of assessing
the connectivity and correctness of sites, and the Multipoint Network module
depends on this information. The SF module depends on the network to perform
its job, and thus is not completely reliable, due to the uncertain synchrony and
susceptibility to attacks of at least parts of the network. The universe of sites
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Figure 4: Architecture of a MAFTIA Node
being monitored can be parameterized, for example: all sites inside a facility,
all sites having to do with ongoing computations at this site, all facility agents,
etc. The Site Membership module, SM, depends on information given by the
SF module. It creates and modies the membership (registered members) and
the view (currently active, or non-failed, or trusted members) of sets of sites,
which we call site-groups. The Communication Support Services module, CS,
implements basic cryptographic primitives (e.g., secure channels and envelopes),
Byzantine agreement, group communication with several reliability and ordering
guarantees, clock synchronization, and other core services. The CS module
depends on information given by the SM module about the composition of the
groups, and on the MN module to access the network.
In the participant part, the Participant Failure Detector module, PF, as-
sesses the liveness of all local participants, based on local information provided
by sensors in the operating system support. The Participant Membership mod-
ule, PM, performs similar operations as the SM, on the membership and view
of participant groups. Note that several participant groups, or simply groups,
may exist in a single site. The site-participant clustering and separation of con-
cerns stated earlier is thus implemented by making a separation between groups
of participants (performing distributed activities), and site-groups of the sites
where those participants reside (performing reliable communication on behalf
of the latter). Clustering can be further enhanced by mapping more than one
group onto the same site-group, in what are called lightweight groups[9]. The
PM module monitors all groups with local members, depending on information
propagated by the SM and by the PF modules, and operating cooperatively with
the corresponding modules in the concerned remote sites. The Activity Sup-
port Services module, AS, implements building blocks that assist participant
activity, such as replication management (e.g., state machine, voting), leader
election, transactional management, key management, and so forth. It depends
on the services provided by the CS module, and on the membership information
provided by the PM module.
In conclusion, in MAFTIA we intend to support dierent styles of basic
interactions among the participants, namely: client-server, for service invoca-
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tions; multipeer, for interactions amongst peers; dissemination, of information
in push or pull form; transactions, for encapsulation of multiple actions. The
middleware platform will support several services at dierent levels of abstrac-
tion, which contribute to support the above-mentioned interaction styles. At
the Communication Services level: byzantine agreement; ordered multicast; reli-
able multicast; time service; secure channels; etc. Likewise, Activity Services are
those concerning the direct support of distributed applications, and amongst the
several building blocks supported by the MAFTIA middleware we nd: leader
election; distributed state machine, voting; distributed transaction and database
support; basic distributed cryptography, random number and key generation;
threshold cryptography; contract signing (fair exchange of signatures); etc.
Implementation
A prototype of the MAFTIA architecture is currently being developed with
the collaboration of several partners. The middleware, in particular, has as
major contributors IBM Zurich with the denition of the CS protocols[2], Uni-
versity of Newcastle upon Tyne who is extending their work on long running
transactions[16], and University of Lisbon with the development of a secure
group-communication suit and the denition of partial-synchronous models[14].
Partners from DERA and University of Saarlandes are formally verifying and
assessing some of the protocols that are being produced[7].
References
[1] M. Abrams, S. Jajodia, and H. Podell, editors. Information Security. IEEE CS
Press, 1995.
[2] C. Cachin, K. Kursawe, and V. Shoup. Random oracles in Constantinople: prac-
tical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography. In Proceedings of
the 19th Annual Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, Portland,
Oregon, July 2000. ACM.
[3] T. Chandra and S. Toueg. Unreliable failure detectors for reliable distributed
systems. Journal of the ACM, 43(2):225{267, Mar. 1996.
[4] F. Cristian and C. Fetzer. The timed asynchronous system model. In Proceedings
of the 28th Annual International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, pages
140{149, Munich, Germany, June 1998. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[5] S. Kent and R. Atkinson. Security architecture for the internet protocol. Technical
Report Request for Comments 2401, IETF, Nov. 1998.
[6] F. Meyer and D. Pradhan. Consensus with dual failure modes. In Digest
of Papers, The 17th International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing,
Pittsburgh-USA, July 1987. IEEE.
[7] B. Ptzmann, and M. Waidner. Composition and integrity preservation of secure
reactive systems. Accepted in 7th ACM Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security, Athens, November 2000. ACM.
[8] D. Powell, D. Seaton, G. Bonn, P. Verssimo, and F. Waeselynk. The Delta-4
approach to dependability in open distributed computing systems. In Digest of
Papers, The 18th International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, Tokyo
- Japan, June 1988. IEEE.
[9] L. Rodrigues, K. Guo, A. Sargento, R. van Renesse, B. Glade, P. Verssimo, and
K. Birman. A transparent light-weight group service. In Proceedings of the 15th
10
IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, pages 130{139, Niagara-on-
the-Lake, Canada, Oct. 1996.
[10] L. Rodrigues and P. Verssimo. Topology-aware algorithms for large-scale com-
munication. In S. Krakowiak and S. Shrivastava, editors, Advances in Distributed
Systems, LNCS 1752, chapter 6, pages 127{156. Springer Verlag, 2000.
[11] H. Schulzrinne, S. Casner, R. Frederick, and V. Jacobson. RTP: A transport
protocol for real-time applications. Status: PROPOSED STANDARD RFC 1889,
Audio-Video Transport Working Group, Jan. 1996.
[12] P. Verssimo and C. Almeida. Quasi-synchronism: a step away from the tradi-
tional fault-tolerant real-time system models. Bulletin of the Technical Committee
on Operating Systems and Application Environments (TCOS), 7(4):35{39, Win-
ter 1995.
[13] P. Verssimo, L. Rodrigues, and A. Casimiro. Cesiumspray: a precise and accu-
rate global time service for large-scale systems. Journal of Real-Time Systems,
12(3):243{294, May 1997.
[14] P. Verssimo, A. Casimiro, and C. Fetzer. The timely computing base: Timely
actions in the presence of uncertain timeliness. In Procs. of DSN 2000, the Int'l
Conf. on Dependable Systems and Networks. IEEE/IFIP, June 2000.
[15] P. Verssimo and M. Raynal. Time, clocks and temporal order. In S. Krakowiak
and S. Shrivastava, editors, Recent Advances in Distributed Systems, volume 1752
of LNCS, chapter 1. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[16] J. Xu, B. Randell, A. Romanovsky, R.J. Stroud, A.F. Zorzo, E. Canver, and
F.v. Henke. Rigorous development of a safety-critical system based on coordi-
nated atomic actions. In Digest of Papers, The 29th International Symposium on
Fault-Tolerant Computing, Madison, June 1999. IEEE.
11
